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Foreword 
Discounting is a key element of catastrophic risk management. Misperceptions of 
discount rates result in inadequate evaluations of risk management strategies, which in 
turn may provoke catastrophes and significantly contribute to increasing vulnerability of 
the society. Therefore applications of the traditional discounting negatively affect 
the outcome of catastrophic risk management. 
 
This paper analyses the implication of potential catastrophic events on the choice of 
discounting. It provides fundamental insights in the nature of discounting that is 
critically important for developing robust strategies for managing catastrophic risks. 
 
It shows that any discounting with constant or declining rates can be linked to random 
"stopping time" events, which define the internal discount-related horizons of 
evaluations. Conversely, any random stopping time horizon induces a discounting, in 
particular, with the standard discount rates. 
 
The expected duration of the stopping time horizon for discount rates obtained from 
capital markets does not exceed a few decades and, as such, these rates may 
significantly underestimate the net benefit of long-term decisions. The proposed 
alternative undiscounted stopping time criterion allows to induce social discounting 
focusing on arrival times of potential extreme events rather then horizons of market 
interests. It depends also on feasible decisions and spatio-temporal variability of 
catastrophic losses. 
 
 ii
Abstract 
The goal of this paper is to specify and summarize assumptions and proofs for new 
approaches to discounting proposed in our catastrophic risk management studies. The 
main issue is concerned with justification of investments, which may turn into benefits 
over long and uncertain time horizon. For example, how can we justify mitigation 
efforts for expected 300-year flood that can occur also next year. The discounting is 
supposed to impose time preferences to resolve this issue, but this view may be 
dramatically misleading. We show that any discounted infinite horizon sum of values 
can be equivalently replaced by undiscounted sum of the same values with random 
finite time horizon. The expected duration of this stopping time horizon for standard 
discount rates obtained from capital markets does not exceed a few decades and 
therefore such rates may significantly underestimate the net benefits of long-term 
decisions.  
The alternative undiscounted random stopping time criterion allows to induce social 
stopping time discounting focusing on arrival times of potential extreme events rather 
then horizons of market interests. In general, induced discount rates are conditional on 
the degree of social commitment to mitigate risk. Random extreme events affect these 
rates, which alter the optimal mitigation efforts that, in turn, change events. This 
endogeneity of the induced discounting restricts exact evaluations necessary for using 
traditional deterministic methods and it calls for stochastic optimisation methods. The 
paper provides insights in the nature of discounting that are critically important for 
developing robust long-term risk management strategies.  
 
Key words: Extreme events, stopping time, catastrophic risks, discounting, 
investments, stochastic optimisation, risk measures. 
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1. Introduction 
The implication of uncertainties and risks for justifying long-term investments is a 
controversial issue. How can we justify investments, which may possibly turn into 
benefits over long and uncertain time horizons in the future? This is a key issue for 
catastrophic risk management. For example, how can we justify investments in climate 
change mitigations, say, in flood defense systems to cope with foreseen extreme 1000-, 
500-, 250-, and 100- floods? The lack of proper evaluations for dealing with extreme 
events dramatically contributes to increasing losses from human-made and natural 
disasters [5]. The analysis of floods that occurred in the summer of 2002 across central 
Europe [18] shows that the potential areas of vulnerability to extreme floods have 
multiplied as a consequence of failed development planning. Underestimation and 
ignorance of low probability/high consequence events have led to the growth of 
buildings and industrial land and sizable value accumulation in flood prone areas 
without proper attention being paid to flood mitigations. A challenge is that an 
endogenously created catastrophe1, say a 300-year flood, has never occurred before in a 
given region. Therefore, purely adaptive policies relying on historical observations 
provide no awareness of the “unknown” risk although, a 300-year flood may occur next 
year. For example, the 2002 floods in Austria, Germany and the Czech Republic were 
classified (in different regions) as 1000-, 500-, 250-, and 100-year events [18].  
                                                 
1
 As a consequence of inappropriate policies. 
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A key issue is development of policies with proper long-term perspectives. The 
traditional discounting is supposed to impose necessary time preferences, but this view 
may be dramatically misleading. There are several possibilities for choosing discount 
rates (see, for example, the discussion in [2], [23], [26], [31]). The traditional approach 
is to use the rates obtained in capital markets. The geometric or exponential discount 
factor  (for small rttrtt eerd −+−− ≈=+= )1ln()1( r ) is usually connected with a 
constant rate r  of returns from capital markets. Since returns in capital markets are 
linked to assets with a lifespan of a few decades, this choice may completely reduce the 
impacts that investments have beyond these intervals (Section 2). Another serious 
problem [24], [20], [33] arises from the use of the expected value Er  and the discount 
factor  that implies additional significant reduction of future values in contrast 
to the expected discount factor  since . These issues 
are discussed in Sections 2 and 3. 
tEr −+ )1(
trE −+ )1( , tt ErrE −− +>>+ )1()1(
An appropriate interest rate is especially difficult to define when decisions involve 
time horizons beyond the interests of the current generation. If future generations are 
not present in the market, e.g., long-term environmental damages are not included in 
production costs, the market interest rates do not reflect the preferences of future 
generations. According to Arrow et al. [2] “the observed market rates of interest refer to 
how individuals are willing to trade off consumption over their own life. These may or 
may not bear close correspondence to how a society is willing to trade off consumption 
across generations”. 
Debates on proper discount rates for long-term problems have a long-standing 
history [2], [31]. Ramsey [27] argued that applying a positive discount rate r  to 
discount values across generations is unethical. Koopmans [21], contrary to Ramsey, 
argued that zero discount rate r  would imply an unacceptably low level of current 
consumption. The use of so-called social discount rates produces two effects [2]. The 
“prescriptive” approach tends to generate relatively low discount rates and thus favors 
mitigation measures and the wellbeing of future generations. The “descriptive” 
approach tends to generate higher discount rates and thus favors less spending on 
mitigations and the wellbeing of the current generation.  
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The constant discount rate has only limited justification [4], [15], [26], [31]. As a 
compromise between “prescriptive” and “descriptive” approaches, Cline [6] argues for a 
declining discount rate: 5% for the first 30 years, and 1.5% later. There have been 
proposals for other schedules and attempts to justify the shape of proper decline. Papers 
[24], [33] show that uncertainty about r  produces a certainty-equivalent discount rate, 
which will generally be declining with time. Weitzman [33] proposed to model discount 
rates by a number of exogenous time dependent scenarios. He argued for rates of 3 – 
4% for the first 25 years, 2% for the next 50 years, 1% for the period 75–300 years and 
0 beyond 300 years. Newell and Pizer [24] analyzed the uncertainty of historical interest 
rates by using data on the US market rate for long-term government bonds. They 
proposed a different declining discount rate justified by a random walk model. 
Chichilinsky [4] proposed a new concept for long-term discounting with a declining 
discount rate by attaching some weight on the present and the future consumption. All 
these papers aim to derive an appropriate exogenous social discount rate.  
Sections 2 and 3 develop a different approach for social discounting. It is shown that 
any discounted sum, so-called net present value (NPV) criterion, tt tVd∑∞=0  of expected 
values  for random variables (r.v.) , tt EvV = tv ,...1,0=t , , under constant 
and declining discount rates  equals the average undiscounted (in the agreement with 
Ramsey’s concerns) random sum  with a random stopping time 
t
tt rd
−+= )1(
tr ∑ =τ ν0t tE τ  defined by 
the given discounting . Therefore, discount rates can be associated with the 
occurrences of “stopping time” random events determining a finite “internal” discount-
related horizon 
td
],0[ τ . The expected duration of τ  and its standard deviation σ  under 
modest market interest rates of 3.5% is approximately 30 years, which may have no 
correspondence with expected, say, 300-year extreme events and 300≈σ . Conversely, 
it is shown that any stopping time random event induces a discounting. A set of 
mutually exclusive stopping time random events, e.g., 1000-, 500-, 250-, and 100- year 
floods, induces discounting with time-declining discount rates. This case corresponds 
also to the discounting with uncertain discount rates r . In particular, a single stopping 
time random event with the standard geometric probability distribution induces the 
standard discounting with constant discount rate r  and . tt rd
−+= )1(
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The effects of catastrophes on the stream of values , tv ,...1,0=t , differ from the 
effects of market uncertainties. Section 4 indicates that catastrophic events pose new 
challenges. They often create so-called endogenous, unknown (with the lack and even 
absence of adequate observations) and interdependent risks, which may potentially 
affect large territories and communities and, on the other hand, are dramatically affected 
by risk management decisions. As a consequence, catastrophic risks generally make it 
impossible to use traditional economic and insurance models [1], [4], [7], [8], [10], [20]. 
Section 4 shows that the concept of undiscounted random stopping time criteria allows 
to induce social discounting that focuses on arrivals of catastrophic events rather then 
the lifetime of market products. Since risk management decisions affect the occurrence 
of disasters in time and space, the induced discounting may depend on spatio-temporal 
distributions of extreme events and feasible sets of decisions. This endogeneity of 
induced spatio-temporal discounting calls for the use of stochastic optimization 
methods, which allow also to address the variability (Remark 2) of discounted criteria 
by using quantiles of random value  ∑ =τ 0t tv  even for deterministic , . 
Section 5 establishes connections of stopping time criteria with dynamic versions of 
CVaR (Conditional Value-at-Risk) risk measures. Section 6 illustrates how 
misperception of induced discounting provokes catastrophes. Section 7 provides 
concluding remarks. 
tv ,...1,0=t
 
2. Standard and Induced Discounting 
The choice of discount rate as a prevailing interest rate within a time horizon of 
existing financial markets is well established [22]. Uncertainties, especially related to 
extreme events, challenge the possibility of markets to offer proper rates for longer time 
horizons. The following simple Proposition 1 and Remark 2 clarify the main concerns. 
The traditional financial approaches [22] often use the so-called net present value 
(NPV) criteria to justify investments. An investment is defined as an expected cash flow 
stream , , over a time horizon TVVV ,...,, 10 tt EvV = ∞≤T . Assume that r  is a constant 
prevailing market interest rate, then alternative investments are compared by 
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TTVdVdVV +++= ...110 , where , , tt dd = 1)1( −+= rd 0,1,...,t T= , is the discount 
factor and V  denotes NPV.  
It is usually assumed that a long-term investment activity has an infinitely long time 
horizon, i.e.,  ∑∞== 0tV ttVd .  (1) 
The stream of values , , can represent an expected cash flow stream of a 
long-term investment activity. In economic growth models and integrated assessment 
models [23], [25], [31] the value  represents utility  of an infinitely living 
representative agent, or welfare 
tV ,...1,0=t
tV )( txU∑ == ni tiiit xuV 1 )(α  of a society with representative 
agents ni ,1= , utilities , consumptions  and welfare weights iu tix iα . Natural selection 
theory treats (1) as Darwinian fitness [30], where discount factors  are associated 
with hazard rates of an environment (Example 2).  
td
The infinite time horizon in (1) creates an illusion of truly long-term analysis. 
Proposition 1 shows that in fact deterministic evaluation (1) accounts only for values  
from a finite random horizon 
tV
],0[ τ  defined by a random stopping time τ  with the 
discount-related probability tdtP =≥ ][τ .  
Proposition 1. Consider a discounted sum (1) with , , . Let 
, , and 
td=td d >r
q = p =
1)1( −+= r 0
d q−1 τ  be a random variable with the geometric probability 
distribution , .  Then [ ] tpqtP ==τ ,...1,0=t [ ]tPd t ≥= τ  and 
∑=∑ ≥=∑ =∞=∞= ττ 000 ][ t tttt tt VEVtPVd . (2) 
Conversely, for any stopping time τ  with a geometric probability distribution 
, ∑=∑ ∞== 00 t ttt t VdVE τ ][ tPd t ≥= τ . 
Proof.  We have  . Conversely, t
tt
tk
k dqqpqpqtP ==−=∑=≥ −∞= 1)1(][τ
 5
[ ]( )
                    
VdV pq               
VpqVtPVE
t tttt tk
k
t
t
k k
tt
k ktt t
.00
0 0000 ∑=∑ ∑= ∑ ∑=∑∑ ==∑ ∞=∞= ∞=
∞= ==∞== ττ
 
That is, any discounted deterministic sum (1) equals to the average undiscounted 
random sum ∑  of the same values . In other words, the discount factor  
induces an “internal” discount-related time horizon 
=τ 0t tV tV tt dd =
],0[ τ  with the geometrically 
distributed τ . Conversely, any geometrically distributed τ  and the criterion  
induces the geometric discounting in the sum .  
∑ =τ 0t tVE∑∞=0t ttVd
Remark 1 (Random stopping time horizon).  We can consider ],0[ τ  being a random 
stopping time horizon associated with the first occurrence of a “killing”, i.e., a 
catastrophic stopping time event. The probability that this event occurs at  is 
 and  is the probability that this event occurs first time at t , i.e., 
,...
p
tpq
1,0=t τ  has a 
geometric probability distribution. Since dp −= 1 , , then the expected 
duration of 
1)1( −=d + rτ , r/1+pE 1/1 ==τ . Therefore, for the interest rate of 3.5%, , 
the expected duration is 
035.0=r
30≈τE  years, i.e., this rate orients the policy analysis on an 
expected 30-year time horizon. The standard deviation p/q=σ , i.e., it equals 
approximately 30 years. The bias in favor of the present in discounting with the rate of 
3.5 percent is easily illustrated [26]. For a project with long-run benefits or costs, 1 Euro 
of benefits or costs in years 50, 100, and 200, has a present value respectively of 0.18, 
0.003, and practically 0 Euros. Definitely, this rate may have no correspondence to how 
society has to deal with a 300-year flood, i.e., a flood with the expected arrival time 
equal to 300 years. Therefore, in the risk management τ  can be associated with the 
arrival of potential catastrophic events rather than with horizons of market interests. The 
induced social discounting ][ tP ≥d t = τ  in this case would have proper long-term 
perspectives dependent on spatio-temporal patterns of catastrophes and risk 
management decisions (see Proposition 3 and Section 4). The discount rate r  can be 
viewed also as a killing (hazard) rate [19] which makes the life expectancy of an 
otherwise infinitely living representative agent or society equal to 1  years. Yet, r/1+
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depending on a concrete situation, stopping time τ  can be associated with the arrival 
time of a reward. 
Remark 2 (Variability of NPV). Disadvantages of this standard criterion (1) are well 
known [22]. In particular, the NPV critically depends on the prevailing interest rate 
which may not be easily defined in practice. In addition, the NPV does not reveal the 
temporal variability of cash flow streams. Two alternative streams may easily have the 
same NPV despite the fact that in one of them all the cash is clustered within a few 
periods, but in another it is spread out evenly over time. This type of temporal 
heterogeneity is critically important for dealing with catastrophic losses which occur 
suddenly as a “spike” in time and space [8].  
The criterion ,  has visible advantages. In particular, it allows to 
address distributional aspects and robust strategies [11] by analyzing the random 
variable  (even for deterministic 
∑ =τ 0t tVE tt EvV =
∑ =τ 0t tV tt Vv = ), e.g., its quantiles defined as maximal 
 satisfying safety constraints  δyy =
∑ ≥≥=τ δ][ yvP
δy
∑ −+ =− τδ 01 },0max{ t t yvEy
0t t . 
Equivalently,   maximizes the concave function (see discussion in [11], p. 16) 
. 
The optimal value of this function defines the so-called CVaR (Conditional Value-at-
Risk) risk measure [29]. 
xTherefore, if variables  depend on some decisions tv  (as in Section 4), then the 
maximization of function 
]}max{[)( 1 −++ − τδ yEyxF ,0 0∑ =t tv  
allows easy control of highly nonlinear (even for linear in x  function ) the safety 
constraints (quantiles of 
tv∑ =τ 0t tv )(xF) in an optimal manner defined by a function  that 
is adjusted to CVaR risk measure (see also Section 5). 
Remark 3 (Shock testing). The sensitivity of models w.r.t. “shocks” (extreme 
scenarios, events, stresses) is often assessed by introducing them into discounted criteria 
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[25], [31]. From Proposition 1 it follows that this may lead to serious miscalculations. 
Let us consider criterion (1) with discount factors ,  and assume 
that a “shock” arrives at a random time moment 
tdtd = 1)1( −+= rd
1,0{ ,...}∈θ  with probability 
, . Then the expected value 
, where  with 
, . Therefore, the stopping time of the “shocked” evaluation   
is defined by 
ttP πγθ == ][ 1)1(1 −+=−= ρπγ
∑∑ =∑ =∑ = ==∞== ),min(0000 θττθ γγ t tt ttt tttt tt VEVEVdVdE tpq=]tP =[τ ∑ =θ 0t ttVdEdq = qp −= 1
),min( θτ . The discount rate of this evaluation is 
111 )1()1()1( −−− +++=+⋅+ ρρρ rrr , i.e., the shocked evaluation increases the 
rate of the original discounting and, hence, the bias in favor of the present.  
Example 1 (Catastrophic Risk Management). The implications of Proposition 1 for 
long-term policy analysis are rather straightforward. Let us consider some important 
cases. It is realistic to assume [26] that the cash flow stream, typical for investment in a 
new nuclear plant, has the following average time horizons. Without a disaster the first 
six years of the stream reflect the costs of construction and commissioning followed by 
40-years of operating life when the plant is producing positive cash flows and, finally, a 
70-year period of expenditure on decommissioning. The flat discount rate of 5%, as 
Remark 1 shows, orients the analysis on a 20-year time horizon. It is clear that a lower 
discount rate places more weight on distant costs and benefits. For example, the explicit 
treatment of a potential 200-year disaster would require at least the discount rate of 
0.5% instead of 5%. A related example is investments in climate change mitigations to 
cope with potential climate change related extreme events. Definitely, a rate of 3.5%, as 
often used in integrated assessment models [31], can easily illustrate that climate change 
does not matter. A shock testing of these models reduces even further their internal 
stopping time horizon. 
Example 2 (Darwinian fitness). Ramsey [27] had introduced discounting, first of all, 
as a mathematical device ensuring the convergence of infinite horizon cumulative 
values. Its various explanations supported by empirical studies were proposed 
afterwards suggesting that humans and animals place less weights on the future then on 
the present (see discussion in [30]). A reason is that future rewards run more risk of 
disappearing. Hence, they should be discounted, where the discount rate is the hazard 
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rate. For example, evidence from selection experiments indicates the existence of a 
trade-off between short-term and long-term fertility, i.e., the existence of life-history 
strategy that discounts the future. In other words, natural selection puts a premium on 
immediate reproductivity. Accordingly, an animal can be treated as a rational optimizer 
maximizing its Darwinian fitness, that can be taken to be equivalent to maximizing the 
expected number of offsprings. In a simple case, fitness is defined [30] then as integral 
, where  is the expected rate of reproductive output at age  if 
the animal survives to that age, and  is the probability of surviving to age . It is 
highly unlikely that an animal is able to learn discount factors (probability density ) 
in order to maximize the Darwinian fitness. The equivalent distribution free stopping 
time criterion requires observations of only lifetime intervals 
∫= ∞0 )()( dttstmF )(tm t
dtts )( t
)(ts
τ , which can be easily 
used for adaptive adjustments of life-history strategies.  
3. Time Declining Discount Rates 
This Section extends Proposition 1 to general time declining discount rates. It also 
shows that a time declining discount rate can be associated even with a set of mutually 
exclusive geometrically distributed extreme (stopping time) events.  This rate is 
determined in a sense by the least probable event.  
Let us consider now a stream of random variables (r.v.) ,..., 10 νν  affected by a set of 
random events including potential catastrophic events. Formally, we can think of  tν  as 
a function  )(ων t  defined on a probability space },{ PΩ  with the set  of related 
random events and the probability measure 
Ω
P  on Ω . We assume that tν  does not 
depend on the “future”, i.e., we assume that },{ PΩ  is adapted to a sequence of 
increasing σ -algebras  (subsets of events from ...⊆ ⊆
0 1
A A Ω , which occur before 
), such that ,...1,0=t tν  is measurable (defined on) w.r.t. A . In what follows, all 
random variables are assumed to be defined on {
t
. }, PΩ
Let ),..., t(, ktk ννσ=  be the σ -algebra generated by tk ννσ ,..., . Consider a stopping 
time τ , which we define as a r. v. ,...}1,0{∈τ , such that event { }t≤τ ,  does 
not depend on values 
,...1,0=t
,..., 21 ++ tt νν , i.e., 1,tσ ∞ .  +
 9
Proposition 2. Consider a discounted sum ∑∞=0t ttVd , ,  where  is an 
increasing positive sequence, 
t
tt rd
−+= )1(
tr
tt EV ν= . Then there is a stopping time τ  such that [ ] tdtP =≥τ  and  [ ] ∑=∑ ≥=∑ =∞=∞= τ νντ 000 t tt tt tt EEtPVd .  (3) 
Conversely, let tE ν  is uniformly bounded. Then, for any stopping time τ   ∑∑ ∞== = 00 t ttt t VdE τ ν , [ tPd t ≥= ]τ , where  is conditional expectation: tV
]|[ tEV tt ≥= τν  
Proof. Consider such any r. v. τ , ,...}1,0{∈τ  that { }t≤τ   does not dependent on 
values 10 , −t..., νν  and 1][ +−== tt ddtP τ , ,...2,1,0=t . Clearly, 
1...]0[ 02110 ==+−+−=≥ dddddP τ , tdtP =≥ ][τ , and [ ]∑∑ ∞=∞= ≥= 00  t tt tt VtPVd τ .  
Let now ∑= =tk ktf 0: ν . From the rearrangement known as the Kolmogorov-
Prohorov’s theorem it follows that [ ] [ ][ ] [ ] ,; ;; 00 0 00 kkk k t tk kt t V kPkE       tEtfEEf ∑ ≥=∑ ≥= =∑ ∑ ==∑ == ∞=∞= ∞= =∞= ττν τνττ   
where ]|[ kvEV kk ≥= τ  and [ AE t ; ]ν ,  denotes unconditional expectation [ ]At IEν ,   
is the indicator function of event 
AI
A . The last assertion follows from the identity 
{ } { 1t t }τ τ≥ = > − , i.e., from the independence of  { }tτ ≥  on 
,tσ ∞ . The change in the 
order of sums is possible due to the uniform boundness of . || tvE
Corollary. If ,...10 ,νν  are independent r.v. or }{ t≥τ , ,...2,1,0=t , does not depend 
on 110 , −t ,...,ννν , then  in both cases of Proposition 2 is unconditional expectation 
. If  
 Vt
tt Ev V = ,...10 ,νν  are independent identically distributed r.v., then the Wald’s 
identity follows from  Proposition1: 
τνντ EEE
t t 00 =∑ = .  
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Proof: It follows from the following rearrangements:  
∑ ===∑ ∑ =∑ =≥ ∞=∞= ∞=∞= 000 ][][][ tk ktt EttPtPtP ττττ . 
Example 3 (Expected catastrophic losses). Assume that a catastrophic event may 
occur at  with probability ,...2,1,0=t p . It is usually defined as (1/p)- year event, say a 
100-year flood. Define τ  as the arrival time of the first catastrophe and let , 0=tv
10 −≤≤ τt , , where  is conditional expected losses given that the event 
occurs at 
ττ Lv = τLτ . Since  only for 0≠tl τ=t , then the expected (unconditional) losses at τ  
are: 
∑ ≥∑ ==+++= ∞=∞= 002210 ][... t tt tt VtPVqpLqqpLpLEv ττ , where . tt pLV =
The next Proposition shows that a set of even geometrically distributed events can 
induce discounting with time declining discount rates. Let us assume that there is a set 
of mutually exclusive events (see also Section 4) of “magnitude” . The 
probability of scenario i  is 
ni ,...,1=
iθ ,  and, conditional on this scenario, the event  
occurs for the first time at 
1
1
=∑=ni iθ i
iτ  with the probability ,  
. Thus, the occurrence of events at t  is characterized by a mixed geometric 
distribution . Let 
t
iii qptP == ][τ ii pq −=1 ,
,...1,0=t
t
i
n
i ii
qp∑ =1θ τ  be the arrival time of a first event. Then [ ] 1 [nt id P t P tτ θ τ== ≥ = ≥∑ ]i i . Since ( ) titiitiii qqpqptP =++=≥ + ...1τ , then 
evaluation (1) takes the form 
t
t
tVdV ∑∞== 0 , .  (4) ∑== ni tiit qd 1θ
Equation (4) essentially modifies the standard geometric discounting. Nevertheless, the 
induced discount factors  for large t  tend to be defined by the smallest discount rate 
of the least probable event. The following proposition is similar to the conclusion in 
[33]. 
td
 11
Proposition 3. Discount factor  in (4) is determined for  by the 
standard geometric discount factor  associated with the least probable event , 
:  for 
∑== ni tiit qd 1 θ ∞→t
t
i
q *
•i
i
ii
pp min* = **/ itit qd θ→ ∞→t . 
Proof. , where ∑ == ni iitit tqd 1 )(* χθ ( ) tiii qqt  /)( *=χ . From ,  
it follows that , , for  and 
ii
pp <• ii qp −=1 ,
0)( →χ ti ∞→t •≠ ii 1)( =• tiχ . Hence,  for 
.   
**/ i
t
it
qd θ→
∞→t
 
Remark 4 (Finite time horizon T). Propositions 1, 2, 3 hold true also for a finite time 
horizon   after substituting probabilities ∞<T ][ tP =τ  and ][ tP ≥τ  by conditional 
probabilities ]|[ TtP ≤= ττ  and ]|[ TtP ≤≥ ττ .  
Remark 5 (Distribution free approach). Propositions 1, 2 provide two alternative 
approaches for discounting: standard discounted criterion of the left hand side of 
equations (1), (2) with an exogenous discounting, or undiscounted criterion of the right 
hand side with τ  defined by random arrival time of stopping time events. Proposition 3 
shows that the corresponding induced discounting  ][ tPd t ≥= τ  can be a complex 
implicit function of spatio-temporal patterns of events. The next Section illustrates, that τ  may depend also on various decisions. All these make it rather difficult to evaluate 
exact risk profiles ][ tP ≥τ  and exogenous discount factors . Therefore, this would 
require the use of the distribution-free random stopping time criterion and STO methods 
rather then the standard distribution-based discounted criterion and deterministic 
optimization methods.  
td
4. Endogenous Discounting  
This Section summarizes typical motivations for developing spatio-temporal 
catastrophic risk management models with rather natural versions of the stopping time 
concepts. A typical model may include often the following loop and the potential for 
positive feedbacks, branching and disequilibrium:  
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1. Stopping time induces discounting in the form of dynamic risk profiles 
][ tPd t ≥= τ ; 
2. The discounting affects optimal mitigation efforts; and 
3. Mitigation efforts affect the stopping time τ , risk profiles ][ tP ≥τ  and the 
discounting  (return to point 1). td
This means that the stopping time criterion induces endogenous spatio-temporal 
endogenous discounting.  
Example 4 (Evaluation of a Flood Management Program). Consider a simple 
version of the catastrophic flood management model developed for the Upper Tisza 
river region [8]. The spatio-temporal structure of this model was motivated by the 
following reasons.  
Throughout the world, the losses from floods and other natural disasters are mainly 
absorbed by the immediate victims and their governments [16]. The insurance industry 
and its premium payers also absorb a portion of catastrophic losses, but even in the 
wealthy countries this share is relatively small. With increasing losses from floods, 
governments are concerned with escalating costs for flood prevention, flood response, 
compensation to victims, and public infrastructure repair. As a new policy, many 
officials would like to increase the responsibility of individuals and local governments 
for flood risks and losses [28], but this is possible only through location-specific 
analysis of risk exposures and potential losses, the mutual interdependencies of these 
losses, and the sensitivities of the losses to new risk management strategies. 
This is a methodologically challenging task requiring at least the development of 
spatio-temporal catastrophe models [7], [8], [10], [32]. Although rich data usually exist 
on aggregate levels, the sufficient location specific data are not available, especially 
data relevant to new policies. Moreover, catastrophes affect large territories and 
communities producing mutually dependent losses with analytically intractable 
multidimensional probability distributions dependent also on various decisions. This 
critically distinguishes the arising problems from a standard risk management situations, 
e.g., the well-known asset-liability management. The standard methods, in particular, 
the existing extreme event theory, are not applicable to rational management of 
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catastrophic risks. The new GIS-based catastrophe models [8], [32] are needed to 
simulate the occurrence of potential extreme events and the samples of mutually 
dependent catastrophic losses for which no or very few historic observations exist.   
In general, a catastrophe model represents the study region by grids, e.g., a relatively 
small pilot Upper Tisza region is represented by 1500x1500 grids [8]. Depending on the 
purpose of the study, these grids are aggregated into a much smaller number of cells 
(locations, compartments) . These cells may correspond to a collection of 
households at a certain site, a collection of grids with similar land-use characteristics, or 
an administrative district or grid with a segment of gas pipeline. The choice of cells 
provides a desirable representation of losses. Accordingly, cells are characterized by 
their content, in general, not necessarily in monetary units. Values can be measured in 
real terms, without using an aggregate dollar value. The content of cells is characterized 
by the vulnerability curves calculating random damages to crops, buildings, 
infrastructure, etc., under a simulated catastrophic scenario.  
mj ,...,2,1=
Catastrophic floods which are simulated by the catastrophe model, affect at random 
different cells and produce mutually dependent random losses , , from a 
catastrophic event at time t . These losses can be modified by various decisions. Some 
of the decisions reduce losses, say a dike, whereas others spread them on a regional, 
national, and international level, e.g., insurance contracts. If 
t
jL mj ,...,1=
),...,,( 21 nxxxx =  is the 
vector of the decision variables, then  is a random function . tjL )(xLtj
Flood occurrences in the region are modeled according to specified probabilistic 
scenarios of catastrophic rainfalls and the reliability of dikes. There are three dikes 
allocated along the region’s river branch. Each of them may break after the occurrence 
at a random time of a 100-, 150-, 500-, and 1000- year rainfall characterized by the so-
called up-stream discharge curves calculating the amount of discharged water to the 
river branch per unit of time. In fact, the discharge curves upscale the information about 
complex rainfall and run-off processes affected by land-use and land-transformation 
policies. This brings considerable uncertainty in the definition of a 1/p - year flood, 
, 1/150, 1/500, 1/1000. Therefore, a 100-year discharge curve may represent, 
in fact, a set of floods with different frequencies 
100/1=p
p , say, 100/1150/1 ≤≤ p . In addition 
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to the interval, the uncertainty about  can be given by a prior distribution. Therefore, a 
single discharge curve, in general, corresponds to a set of -year floods, where  is 
characterized by a prior probability distribution. For example, it can be characterized by 
a finite number of probabilistic scenarios  with prior probabilities 
p
p/1 p
npp ,...,1 nθθ ,...,1  as 
in Proposition 3. 
The stopping time can be defined differently, depending on the purpose of the policy 
analysis. A catastrophic flood in our example occurs due to the break of one of the three 
dikes. These events are considered as mutually exclusive events, since the break of a 
dike in the pilot region releases the “pressure” on other dikes. Therefore, the stopping 
time τ  can be defined as the first time moment of a dike break. In this case, the 
probability or induced discount factor  ][ tPd t ≥= τ  is an implicit function of t , 
probabilities ii p,θ , , and the probability of a dike break. The situation is 
complicated further by the deterioration of dikes in time and/or by inappropriate 
maintenance of the flood protection system (see also Section 6), e.g., modifications to 
the dikes, the removal of some of them, and building new retention areas and reservoirs. 
Besides these structural decisions, the stopping time 
ni ,...,1=
τ  can be affected by other 
decisions, e.g., land use policies. Accordingly, depending on goals, the definition of 
stopping time τ  can be further modified. For example, let us assume that the region 
[14] participates in the flood management program through payments to a mutual 
catastrophe fund, which has to support a flood protection system and compensates 
losses to victims. To enforce the participation in the program, the government provides 
only partial coverages of losses. The stability of this program critically depends on the 
insolvency of the fund that may require a new definition of τ . Let β  be a fixed 
investment rate enabling the support of the system of dikes on a certain safety level and ξ  be a random time of a first catastrophic flood. Denote by jLξ  random losses at 
location j , mj ,1= , at time t ξ=  and by jπ  the premium rate paid by location j  to 
the mutual catastrophe fund. Then, its accumulated risk reserve at time ξ  together with 
a fixed partial compensation of losses 
j
j
Lξχ∑  by the government is 
, where βξϕχπξ ξξξ −∑−∑ ∑+=
j
jj
j j
jj LLR 10 ≤≤ jϕ , is the portion of losses 
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compensated by the fund at location j . Let us also assume that the functioning of the 
flood management program is considered as a long-term activity assuming that growth 
and aging processes compensate each other. Then, the insolvency of the fund is 
associated with the event: 
0<−∑−∑ ∑+ βξϕχπξ ξξ
j
jj
j j
jj LL .  (5) 
Inequality (5) defines extreme random events affected by various feasible decisions 
x  including components ),1,,,,,( mjb jjj =βχϕπ . The likelihood of event (5) 
determines the vulnerability of the program. It is more natural now to define the 
stopping time τ  as the first time when event (5) occurs. In this case τ  would depend on 
all components of vector x  and the induced discounting would focus on time horizons 
associated with the occurrence of the event (5).  
 
5. Dynamic risk profiles and CVaR risk measure 
 
The following Example 5 illustrates that the probability distributions ][ tP ≥τ , 
, itself represent key safety characteristics of catastrophic risk management 
programs. Induced discounting 
,...1,0=t
][ tPdt ≥= τ  then “controls” these risk profiles 
implicitly through their contributions to discounted goals of programs. Another 
possibility as this Section shows is to impose explicitly safety constraints of the type 
ttP γτ ≥≥ ][  for some safety levels tγ , ,...1,0=t . In this case resulting robust strategies 
would directly control the safety constraints.  
Example 5 (Safety constraints). The occurrence of disasters is often associated with 
the likelihood of some processes abruptly passing “vital” thresholds. This is a typical 
situation for insurance, where the risk process is defined by flows of premiums and 
claims whereas thresholds are defined by insolvency constraints [12]. A similar 
situation arises in the control of environmental targets and in the design of disaster 
management programs [7], [8], [10]. Assume that there is a random process  and the 
threshold is defined by a random 
tR
tρ . In spatial modeling,  and tR tρ  can be large-
dimensional vectors reflecting the overall situation in different locations of a region. Let 
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us define the stopping time τ  as the first time moment t  when  is below tR tρ . By 
introducing appropriate risk management decisions x  it is often possible to affect  
and 
tR
tρ  in order to ensure the safety constraints [ ]ρ ≥ γ≥ ttRP , for some safety level γ , 
.  ,...2,1,0=t
The use of this type safety constraints is a rather standard approach for coping with 
risks in the insurance, finance, and nuclear industries. For example, the safety 
regulations of nuclear plants assume that the violation of safety constraints may occur 
only once in  years, i.e. 710 7101 −−=γ . It is remarkable that the use of stopping time 
criterion as in the right-hand side of (2) has strong connections with the dynamic safety 
constraints and dynamic versions of static CVaR risk measures [29]. Let us illustrate 
this by using the simplest version of climate change stabilization models discussed in 
[12]. 
Assume that , where decision variables , , 
.  We can think of  as a CO2 emission reduction (see also [ ]) at the 
beginning of period k . At time t  the target value on total emission reduction   in 
period  is given as a random variable 
∑= =tk kt xR 0 0≥kx tk ,...,1,0=∞<≤ Tt kx
tR
t tρ . It is assumed that the exact value of  tρ  may 
be revealed at a random period τ , tdtP =≥ ][τ . The decision path  
has to be chosen ex-ante in period 
),...,,( 10 Txxxx =
0=t  to mitigate climate change impacts associated 
with the case ττ ρ<R .  Consider the loss function associated with emission mitigation 
strategy x  and given τ :  
]},0max{[)( 0∑ −+= = =τ τρt tttttt IRbxcExV ,                                               (6) 
where deterministic coefficients t  can be viewed as marginal costs, and  as risk 
factors.   
c tb
This can be written (Example 3) as 
∑ −+= = =Tt t∑k kttttt xEbxcdxV 0 0 }],0max{[)( ρ .                                                     
Assume that  is a continuously differentiable function, e.g., a component of 
random vector 
)(xV
),...,,( 10 Tρρρρ =  has a continuous density function. Also, assume for 
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now that there exists a positive optimal solution , , 
minimizing  subject to , 
),...,,( **1*0* Txxxx = 0* >tx
)(xV 0≥tx Tt ,...,1,0= . Then, from the optimality condition for 
stochastic minimax problems (see discussions in [11], p. 16) it follows that for ,  *xx =
0][ 0 =∑ ∑ ≤−= = =T tk ks ksktx xPbcV t ρ ,  Tt ,...,1,0= .   
From this it follows sequentially for 0,...,1, −= TTt ,  
TTT
T
k k
bcxP /][ 0 =≤∑ = ρ , tttttk k bccxP /)(][ 10 += −=≤∑ ρ , 1,...,1,0 −= Tt . (7)   
Since ][},0max{ tttRttt RPRIERE tt ≥−=− ≥ ρρρ ρ , then from (7) it follows that 
, which can be viewed as a dynamic CVaR (Conditonal-Value-at-
Risk) risk measure. Equations (7) can be used to control dynamic risk profiles, say, 
profiles with a given safety level 
ττρτ RIEpbxV ≥=)( *
γ  as in Example 5: tttTT bccbc /)(/1 1+−==− γ   
, by appropriate choice of risk factors  similar to stationary CVaR risk 
measures. In this case the minimization of (6) controls safety constraints (7) with given 
safety level 
1,...,1,0 −= Tt tb
γ , i.e.,  
γρ −=∑ ≤= 1][ 0tk kkxP , .                                                                 (8) Tt ,...,1,0=
This is a remarkable result, since the safety constraints, as a rule, are non-convex 
and even discontinuous, whereas the minimization of function (6) is often a convex 
problem for important practical cases.  
Equations (7) are derived so far from the existence of the positive optimal solution 
.  The following Proposition clarifies this assumption. *x
Proposition 4. The existence of positive optimal solution follows from 1/ <TT dc , 
, 1/)( 1 <− + ttt dcc 1,...,1,0 −= Tt , and the monotonicity of quantiles tβ , 
Tβββ <<< ...10  defined by equations  
TTTT dcP /][ =≤ ρβ , ttttt dccP /)(][ 1+−=≤ ρβ , 1,...,1,0 −= Tt . 
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Proof. Indeed, the first requirement guarantees that , , 
. From the second requirement it follows that , i.e., , and 
so on.   
0*0 >x 00 *0 >∑ =tk x
Tt ,...,2,1= *0*1*0 xxx >+ 0*1 >x
Let us note that in general cases outlined in Example 5, process  is given by 
stochastic equations , 
tR
),(1 ttt xtgRR =−+ 1,...,1,0 −= Tt , where  is a random 
function. In this case equations (7), (8) would have a form of conditional expectation 
rather then quantiles. It is even easy to see for 
),( txtg
ttt xaxtg =),( , where  are random 
variables. In rather general cases a minimization problem (6) can be solved by 
distribution-free stochastic optimization methods proposed in [7], [8], [10], [13], i.e., 
methods which don’t use (in general) exact probability distributions. 
ta
Remark 6 (Robust decision). The stopping time τ  in model (6) is not associated 
with the violation of safety constraint (8). In catastrophic risk management the model 
(6) is usually considered as an auxiliary submodel. For example, if random tρ  are 
affected by a set of decisions  with a cost function , then the minimization of 
function  yields robust decision minimizing total costs under safety 
constraints (8) and a dynamic version of the CVaR risk measure. 
y )( yF
)()( yFxV +
 
6. Intertemporal inconsistency.  
The time consistency of discounting means that the evaluation of an investment 
project today ( ), will have the same discount factor as the evaluation of the same 
project after any time interval  in the future. In other words, despite delayed 
implementation of the project we always found ourselves in the same environment.  
Only geometric or exponential discounting, , 
0=t
],0[ T
ttdt
t eedd
λ−=== )(ln dln−=λ , defines 
a homogeneous time consistent preference: [ ]...... 111100 ++++++= +−−∞=∑ TTTTTt tt dVVdVddVVVd .  
This is also connected with the geometric probability distribution of the discount 
related stopping time τ  in (2): if [ ] tdtP =≥τ , , then 10 << d
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[ ] ttt ddddtP )1(1 −=−== +τ , ,...1,0=t . In other words, the consistency is the direct 
consequence of the well-known “memoryless” feature of geometric and exponential 
probability distributions: for any , , 0≥t 0≥s
)1(/)1(]|[ dddddtstP stst −=−=≥+= +ττ . 
Hence, independently of waiting time , the probability of the stopping time 
occurrence at  is  the same as at the initial time moment 
t
st + 0=t . 
For other discount factors with time-dependent rates, their time inconsistency 
requires appropriate adjustments of discount factors for projects undertaken later rather 
than earlier. The misperception of this inconsistency may provoke increasing 
vulnerability and catastrophic losses. Let us consider typical scenarios of such 
developments. Section 4 shows that the adequate perception of proper discounting is a 
challenging task requiring models that allow the explicit evaluation of related risk 
profiles. This Section, in fact, illustrates that the design of such models has to be 
considered as a key mitigation measure to cope with increasing vulnerability. 
A number of authors distinguish between various types of so-called “imperfect 
altruism” resulting in the lack of social commitment to mitigate risks. For example, 
there were alluded definitions of a naïve, a sophisticated and a committed (ideal) 
society. The main differences between these three societies and how they provoke 
catastrophes are summarized in [9] by using a simplified flood management model 
outlined in Section 4. This model has the fixed 100-year horizon T in which three 
societies, the naïve, the sophisticated, and the committed, live and plan for coping with 
the catastrophic losses that may occur due to break of a dyke from 150-year flood with 
time consistent geometric probability distribution. They are able to mitigate the 
reliability of dikes and losses by paying fair premiums to the catastrophe fund. But, 
depending on their perception of risk profiles or induced discounting, the results are 
dramatically different.  
The current generation of The Naïve Society is aware of a possible catastrophe. It 
maximizes the (identical for all generations) value function taking into account the 
potential need to save for paying premiums. Unfortunately, it has a misleading view on 
the catastrophe, namely, if the catastrophe has not occurred in the later generation the 
society believes that it will not occur within the current generation with the same 
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probability. Thus, it relies on geometric probability distribution and fails to take into 
account the time inconsistency induced by increasing the probability of a dike break due 
to aging processes. Therefore, the first generation of the society postpones the 
implementation of decisions, i.e., the naïve society puts also its preferences on 
consumption as the first priority consuming at a higher rate than it actually plans. 
For the next generation the time is shifted forward by 20 years, and the second 
generation, similar to the first, plans but does not implement saving actions essential for 
the catastrophe fund to function. The risk profiles, time preferences, premiums, and the 
actions are not adjusted towards the real escalating risks. In a similar way, behave the 
next generations. The plans are never implemented and the view on a catastrophe 
remains time invariant despite dramatic increase of risk. 
The Sophisticated Society implies a correct understanding of the time-inconsistent 
discounting induced by the deteriorating system of dikes. But this society, similar to the 
naïve planners, also evaluates present consumption to be much higher than the future 
one. This leads to postponing the decisions. Due to these delays, the risk burden is 
increasingly shifted to the next generation, calculated premiums become higher and 
higher. If a catastrophe occurs, this society will also be not prepared to cope with losses 
as catastrophe management is not functioning. 
The “pathologies” of these societies can be explained by their misperception of 
risks, and, the lack of committed actions.  
The Committed Society is similar to that of the sophisticated society. In contrast 
though, this society is able to implement decisions because its calculations demonstrate 
that the delays in actions may dramatically affect individuals and the growth of societies 
as a whole. Individuals could be better off if their consumption options were limited and 
their choices constrained by anticipating risks. As a direct consequence of the 
committed actions, the premiums that the society pays for coping with catastrophes in 
100 years time are much lower than those of the sophisticated society. 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 
The proposed new approach to discounting is based on undiscounted stopping-time 
criterion which is equivalent to the standard discounted criterion in the case of market-
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related discount factors. In general, the stopping time criterion induces the discounting 
that depends on spatio-temporal patterns of catastrophes and various relevant decisions, 
More formally, this paper demonstrates that discount factors ,  can be 
associated with the occurrence of an extreme “stopping time” event at random time 
td ,...1,0=t τ  
with probability tdtP =≥ ][τ . Consequently, the infinite discounted sum , ∑∞=0t ttVd
tt EV ν= , is replaced by the undiscounted expectation ∑ =τ 0t tvE  within the finite 
interval ],0[ τ . The use of the stopping time criterion ∑ =τ 0t tvE  induces the standard 
discounting in the case when τ  is associated with the lifetime of market products. In 
dealing with catastrophic risks, the stopping time τ  can be associated with the arrival 
time of potential catastrophic events. The use of random criterion ∑ =τ 0t tv  allows to 
address the variability of valuations even in the case of deterministic flows , , …. 
In this case, it is often important to substitute the expected value of random sum 
0V 1V
∑ =τ 0t tv  by its quantiles. Mitigation efforts affect the occurrence of extreme events and, 
thus, they affect discounting, which in turn affects mitigations. This endogeneity of 
discounting restricts exact evaluations of  and the consequent use of deterministic 
methods and it calls for specific stochastic optimization methods.  
td
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